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THE WORKSHOP
On September 21, 2020, DGAP and the German Ministry 
of Defence hosted an expert workshop on the Strategic 
Compass and its four baskets. Participating think-tank-
ers from across Europe were invited to provide input and 
discuss their ideas in four break-out sessions. 
 
Three guiding questions structured the input and debate 
during the workshop and its break-out sessions:
• In your opinion, which concrete topics or issues should 
be addressed at the strategic level in the four thematic 
blocks?
• What critical points do you anticipate concerning diverg-
ing threat perceptions of the individual EU member states?
• In your view, what measures would be necessary for the 
Strategic Compass to generate real added value for an EU 
capable of action?
The editors and authors of this Workshop Report want to 
extend their sincere gratitude to their colleagues for their 
time and input during the workshop. The following tables 
show the working groups and the participants:
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Introduction
The “Strategic Compass” is one of the most discussed initia-
tives related to EU security and defense during Germany’s 
ongoing Presidency of the Council of the European Union 
in the second half of 2020 and will continue to be in 2021. 
It serves three purposes: First, to formulate the first com-
mon threat analysis of the EU. Second, to agree on clear and 
achievable strategic objectives for the EU to strengthen the 
EU as an actor in security and defense. And third, to offer 
political guidance for future military planning processes. 
This report1 outlines challenges, ideas, and recommenda-
tions for the Strategic Compass and its four baskets – cri-
sis management, resilience, capability development, and 
partnerships.
KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Even though each basket faces its challenges, as described 
by our colleagues below, some cross-cutting themes 
emerge that shape the requirements for the Strategic Com-
pass as a whole:
Expanding Agenda: First, there is a sense of expansion that 
characterizes each basket. Whether it is the number of cri-
ses around Europe, the expanding definition and thus de-
mands on resilience, a growing number of capabilities and 
domains to operate (in), or the quantity of partnerships, 
these developments not only increase the overall complex-
ity of Europe’s security and defense policy but also require 
serious recalibration of European instruments and ambi-
tions in this policy field.
Guidance: The expectation of guidance is the second com-
mon theme that emerges when discussing the Strategic 
Compass. Guidance here means that the Compass, in the 
end, should provide some sort of benchmark in some areas 
(capabilities, partnerships) and greater precision in func-
tional or regional priorities for others (crisis management, 
resilience). Moreover, the Strategic Compass shall serve as 
a link between the four baskets and their aspects of securi-
ty and defense policy, as the connections between them are 
1  On September 21,st 2020, the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and the German Ministry of Defence hosted an expert workshop. Participating think-tankers from 
across Europe were invited to provide input and discuss their ideas in four break-out sessions. The discussion marks the second event in a series of workshops that accompanies 
Germany’s presidency of the EU Council on its projects and goals in security and defense. The series aims to create a dialogue among experts from government and think-tank 
communities across Europe on topics such as the further development of EU defense initiatives, the Strategic Compass, and EU-NATO cooperation.
2  See also C. Major and C. Mölling, “Europe, Germany and defense: priorities and challenges of the German EU presidency and the way ahead for European Defense,” Note 
n°63/20, Foundation pour la Recherche Strategique (October 2020), p. 10: https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/notes/2020/202063.pdf 
(last accessed October 23, 2020).
multifold and mutually influential when defining the EU’s 
ambitions. 
Member States’ Buy-in: Lastly, the success of the Strategic 
Compass, as with every significant EU initiative, remains in 
the hands of the member states and whether they develop 
both practical and political ownership.2 It will remain a task 
for all those in favor of the Strategic Compass to support it 
throughout the next two years (and beyond) to see it come 
together and provide more than just “another paper” in Eu-
ropean security and defense policy.
The following recommendations emerged from the input 
provided by the authors of the report chapters on each bas-
ket, as well as debates among the workshop participants.
Recommendations:
1. Convergence on a narrower set of key priorities is need-ed for quicker, more united, and more effective EU cri-
sis response. The Strategic Compass thus needs to provide 
greater precision on the functional and regional priorities of 
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
2. The correct sequencing of workshops during the stra-tegic dialogue in 2021 could conduce the member 
states to first define a narrower set of priorities before em-
barking on the more technical adjustment of instruments 
and institutions.
3. Secure lasting impact of the Strategic Compass by highlighting work on subsequent documents like an 
updated Implementation Plan on Security and Defence and 
a new Headline Goal, as well as better instruments to en-
sure coherence and compliance.
4. The subsidiarity principle should be applied wherever appropriate. But comprehensive resilience can only be 
achieved through the interaction of different levels and ac-
tors: Between the EU institutions, the EU and its member 
states, the public and private sectors, civil and military ac-
tors, and the EU and NATO.
5. In capability development, it will be especially im-portant to utilize the consensual nature of the CS-
DP to work closely with those EU member states that favor 
the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Nevertheless, 
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greater linkages with national capability planning systems 
work both ways: The Strategic Compass needs to consider 
some system of accountability and timelines to ensure that 
member states adhere to the targets they set in the Council.
6. Initiate inquiry into possible ways to streamline and simplify the EU’s capability prioritization process, as 
well as strengthening political structures and the integra-
tion of military expertise without treaty changes and/or 
disrupting the current institutional landscape.
7. Prioritize partnerships in the function of their value in accomplishing well-defined ends.
8. Operationalize the complementarity between the EU, NATO, and UN frameworks. Address and define the 
division of labor between partners, between EU mem-
bers, within the EU as an organization, as well as between 
civilian and military tools for both resilience and crisis 
management.
The EU’s Strategic Compass and Its Four Baskets – Recommendations to Make the Most of It




Dr. Nicole Koenig, Deputy Director, 
Jacques Delors Centre
INTRODUCTION 
Crisis management missions and operations are the most 
visible and tangible expression of the CSDP. The Global 
Strategy of 2016 set the political objectives: responding to 
external conflicts and crises, capacity building of partners, 
and protecting the Union and its citizens. Since 2016, vari-
ous steps have been taken to refine EU crisis management 
tools and institutions. However, the central weakness of the 
Global Strategy is its vagueness. The EU does not have the 
resources to respond to all conflicts and crises globally and 
even in its periphery. If the Strategic Compass is to add val-
ue, the member states need to address this issue head-on: 
What should be the main purpose of the CSDP? A more de-
tailed discussion on the modalities and tools can only be 
undertaken once this question is solved. A review of the di-
vision of labor between NATO, the UN, and a variety of EU 
institutions is in order. In addition, we need a sensible dis-
cussion of what type of means the EU needs to meet the 
“revised” CSDP goals and how compliance with them can be 
ensured.  
FOCUS ON STRATEGIC GOALS AND 
PRIORITIES
The Strategic Compass should be used as an opportunity 
to forge a clearer understanding of the CSDP’s overarch-
ing objectives for the next decade. This will require answer-
ing some fundamental questions: What should the balance 
between crisis management and protection/territorial de-
fense be? If the CSDP’s central purpose is crisis manage-
ment, then what type of crises should the EU get involved 
in? Should it limit itself to stabilizing its immediate neigh-
borhood? Or should the CSDP become a tool for global 
power projection? Alternatively, it could also become an in-
strument to protect the “European homeland” through, for 
example, border management, the fight against organized 
crime, and the protection of critical infrastructure. 
In other words, the Strategic Compass needs to provide 
greater precision on the functional and regional priorities of 
the CSDP. Making these choices will no doubt be controver-
sial due to the different strategic cultures and preferences. 
However, let’s face it: Considering the member states’ lim-
ited willingness to provide resources and personnel, the EU 
will not be able to equally address all items of a broad 360° 
threat analysis. Convergence on a narrower set of key prior-
ities is needed for quicker, more united, and more effective 
EU crisis response.
REVIEW THE INTERNATIONAL AND 
INTERNAL DIVISION OF LABOR 
Bringing together the crisis management and partnership 
baskets, the member states should reassess the current in-
ternational division of labor: Where should the EU be able 
to intervene autonomously? How can we ensure better co-
ordination between the EU, NATO, and UN in areas where 
mandates overlap? Such broader reflections should entail 
a review of cooperation modalities. For example: How can 
EU-NATO cooperation in hybrid crisis response be deep-
ened despite the political obstacles? Can the outdated Ber-
lin Plus mechanism be replaced by more flexible forms of 
cooperation? Should the EU provide modular crisis man-
agement packages to UN peace operations?
The Strategic Compass should also be used to review the 
EU’s internal division of labor. While the EU’s comparative 
advantage is said to be its ability to combine civilian and 
military tools, there is still too much stovepiping. The mem-
ber states should raise the level of ambition of civil-mili-
tary crisis management. Should the Military Planning and 
Conduct Capability (MPCC) and Civilian Planning and Con-
duct Capability (CPCC) be merged into a real civil-mili-
tary headquarters? What can the EU learn from the “One 
UN” approach to peacebuilding and peace operations? How 
could cooperation on the ground between EU missions, op-
erations, and delegations be enhanced? What lessons can 
we draw from regional concepts as seen in the Sahel? How 
does the European Peace Facility fit in? 
MATCH MEANS AND ENDS 
Only after mapping threats and prioritizing ends, should the 
member states turn to adjusting the means. Therein, they 
should beware of mismatching threats and instruments. We 
have seen a growing tendency to use EU crisis management 
for migration management. While migration is certainly a 
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priority for many member states, missions and operations 
are not always the right tools. The Commission or the EU’s 
border management agency Frontex might be better suit-
ed to the task. The case of Operation IRINI, where the mud-
dling of migration and security objectives has delayed the 
launch of the operation and limited its effectiveness, should 
serve as a negative example.
The member states should establish a close link between the 
crisis management and capability baskets. The EU needs a dif-
ferent set of capabilities depending on whether it focuses on 
crisis management in the broader neighborhood or home-
land protection. The Civilian CSDP Compact provides sensible 
goals that need to be implemented. An updated EU Headline 
Goal could concretize the EU’s military level of ambition in 
terms of scale. Together with functional and regional prior-
ities, embedded in illustrative scenarios, it should inform the 
selection of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and 
European Defence Fund (EDF) projects, as well as spending 
under the Military Mobility Framework. 
Finally, the Strategic Compass should focus on implementa-
tion and compliance with joint targets. The member states 
should discuss the usability of the Battlegroups in light of 
strategic priorities and the international division of labor. 
More member states should join the PESCO project Europe-
an Union Force (EUFOR) Crisis Response Operation Core for it 
to become a prime venue for implementation. To ensure com-
pliance beyond single projects, the member states could also 
develop a peer review mechanism within PESCO3 with a spe-
cific crisis management arm. They could thus evaluate each 
other’s performance on various dimensions while exchanging 
best practices and creating shared experiences.
CONCLUSION 
There are two risks attached to the work in the crisis man-
agement basket. One is to get stuck in meta-debates, such 
as on strategic autonomy. The other is to get lost in mi-
cro-dossiers, such as refining concepts for EU training mis-
sions. For the work to add value, the member states need 
courage, the right process, and adequate follow-up. They 
need courage to address the controversial strategic ques-
tions and to prioritize. The right sequencing of workshops 
could conduce the member states to first define a narrower 
set of priorities before embarking on the more technical ad-
justment of instruments and institutions. Full engagement 
of the Commission in the process is necessary for an ambi-
tious civil-military approach to both crisis management and 
3  T. Lațici, “No Pain, No Gain: Taking PESCO to the Gym,” Security Policy Brief No. 129, Egmont Institute (September 2020),  https://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/
uploads/2020/08/spb129-tania-latici-final-3.pdf (accessed October 20, 2020).
resilience. Whether or not the document will have a last-
ing effect depends on the follow-up, such as through an up-
dated Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, a new 
Headline Goal, and better ways to ensure compliance.
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Resilience
Dr. Jana Puglierin, Head of the Berlin Office,  
European Council on Foreign Relations
INTRODUCTION 
“Resilience” has become one of the most widely used buzz-
words of recent years. The concept has been embraced 
by a wide range of actors and in a multitude of contexts. 
In the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) alone the 
terms “resilience” or “resilient” – understood as “the ability 
of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and re-
covering from internal and external crises”4 – appear more 
than 40 times. Building “state and societal resilience” to the 
EU’s East and South is identified as one of the five key prior-
ities for the EU’s external action. 
RESILIENCE AS A MOVING TARGET
However, resilience has become such a broad concept that 
the challenge in writing the Strategic Compass is to de-
fine clearly what is meant by the term in a security and 
defense framework. As the concept of security has expand-
ed, so has the concept of resilience. Today, the lines be-
tween peace and war and between external and internal 
security are increasingly blurred. With the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, first large-scale cyberattacks, targeted disinforma-
tion campaigns, but also global developments such as cli-
mate change, the understanding of resilience has constantly 
evolved. Recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted 
additional vulnerabilities of modern Western societies, such 
as the security of supplies or the ability to deal with mass 
casualties. 
Resilience is, therefore, not a static constitution that states 
and/or societies can achieve, but a dynamic concept that 
needs constant adaptation. The threat analysis on which the 
Strategic Compass is based can therefore only be of limit-
ed use in defining the resilience cluster. It is certainly not 
enough to understand resilience in narrow CSDP terms. 
The Compass will have to define resilience as a compre-
hensive approach that includes a wide range of military, po-
litical, societal, economic, and environmental dimensions. 
After all, it is important not only to increase resilience to 
4  European Commission, European Union Global Strategy (June 2016), p. 23: <https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf>  
(accessed October 20, 2020).
already known threats. Rather, resilience describes a ba-
sic constitution that must be achieved to deal with those 
threats that are not yet known to exist. Resilience aims to 
minimize the disruptive impact of any given event on the 
normal functioning of the EU, its member states, and Euro-
pean societies. 
COMPREHENSIVENESS RECOMMENDED
We would recommend taking the examples of resil-
ience-building in many of the Nordic and Baltic countries 
for further reflection on how to develop the resilience clus-
ter. Those nations apply a comprehensive approach to se-
curity that incorporates a broad range of military and 
non-military aspects of national security and crisis man-
agement. “Comprehensive security” is seen as a result of the 
activities of many institutions and involves the state author-
ities and armed forces, as well as NGOs and local communi-
ties. The Strategic Compass should contribute to raising the 
civilian awareness of the multidimensional character of to-
day’s security threats, through crucial energy or communi-
cation dependencies or foreign direct investment in critical 
European infrastructure, for example. 
The Strategic Compass must have an intersectoral and in-
teragency “whole of the EU approach,” linking the various 
instruments that the EU institutions and the member states 
need to manage in order to enhance the EU’s resilience. No 
member state in the EU can alone become sufficiently re-
silient to current threats. However, many of the measures 
that need to be taken to achieve greater resilience fall with-
in national competence, and often within the private sec-
tor. The subsidiarity principle should be applied wherever 
appropriate. But resilience can only be achieved through 
the interaction of different levels and actors: between the 
EU institutions, the EU and its member states, the public 
and private sectors, civil and military actors, the EU and 
NATO. The aim of the Strategic Compass should be to bring 
the different pillars together and to give some guidance for 
fruitful cooperation. 
EU SOLIDARITY
In the event of a crisis, the EU must be able to react quickly. 
In order to ensure this, implementation modalities for Arti-
cle 42.7 TEU and Article 222 TFEU should be further oper-
ationalized in the Strategic Compass. The first application 
of the European assistance clause was marked neither by 
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a coherent strategy nor by a common planning approach. 
EU solidarity thus looked more like a loose-leaf compilation 
than a concerted effort. In order to apply the full potential 
of the European mutual assistance clause in the future, it 
makes sense to give the EU institutions a coordinating role 
while the member states continue to lead the efforts. What 
is more, the first invocation of Article 42.7 TEU brought 
only a handful of countries to significantly increase their 
engagement; most reactions involved rather small contri-
butions and forms of support that may have occurred any-
way. The Strategic Compass should therefore aim to make 
member states’ solidarity measures more binding. Concern-
ing the EU’s possible role in territorial defense (following 
the activation of Article 42.7 TEU), the majority of the work-
ing group was in favor of excluding this issue from the fur-
ther development of the resilience cluster and instead of 
prioritizing the European adaptation to US priorities with-
in NATO. 
The EU’s Strategic Compass and Its Four Baskets – Recommendations to Make the Most of It




Dr. Daniel Fiott, Security and Defence Editor,  
European Union Institute for Security Studies5
INTRODUCTION
The Strategic Compass promises to give the EU greater 
clarity over the strategic direction of CSDP and, potential-
ly, EU security and defense more broadly. Which direction 
is the EU headed? What do North, South, East, and West 
mean in the context of CSDP? Who is carrying the Com-
pass, and who is joining the Union on the route? Can EU 
security and defense ever function as effectively and accu-
rately as a compass? These are longstanding questions, of 
course, but the process the EU is about to embark on al-
so calls for a debate about what the EU will pack in its back-
packs ( just a pickaxe, or is a proverbial Swiss Army Knife 
required for the journey?). An uncomfortable truth is that 
any discussion about capabilities under the Strategic Com-
pass process will have to deal squarely with the unfulfilled 
promises of the past: that is, the Union’s longstanding in-
ability to fill capability shortfalls. After twenty years of CS-
DP, the gaps barely merit mentioning, although they serve 
as a painful reminder of failed commitments. While Europe-
ans are starting to bring online air-to-air refueling and stra-
tegic airlift capabilities, the continent is still behind in areas 
such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 
and it continues to struggle to generate the force packages 
required for missions and operations.
The Strategic Compass emerges at an important time for 
the EU, especially given the geopolitical challenges it cur-
rently faces. Yet, there is a risk that if there is insufficient 
and/or no sustained buy-in from member state govern-
ments, the Compass will only raise expectations further 
without making any real material difference. The Compass’ 
third basket on capabilities therefore emerges as a crucial 
pillar of the whole exercise – without capacity, defense is 
simply built on stilts. Yet, before the EU identifies what ca-
pabilities it requires – through the other baskets – it needs 
to make sense of the geopolitical terrain facing the EU. The 
truth is that this is not your father’s CSDP anymore, and 
5  The views in this contribution do not necessarily reflect the position of the EU Institute for Security Studies or the European Union.
missions and operations have to keep abreast with tech-
nological and strategic/tactical shifts in conflict. The wid-
er political context should be kept in mind too. The EU will 
need to grapple with the uncertain economic effects of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and the Union appears committed to 
achieving technological sovereignty all while Washington 
and Beijing battle for global supremacy.
With this context in mind, developing a capabilities bas-
ket under the Strategic Compass will require engagement 
with at least four major questions: 1) Should EU capability 
development cater only to the needs of CSDP, or is a wid-
er concept of EU security and defense required?; 2) What 
is the correct balance between filling existing capability 
shortfalls and investing in future technologies, systems, and 
platforms?; 3) What capabilities should be prioritized to si-
multaneously respond to operational needs, industrial ob-
jectives, and increased technological sovereignty?; and 4) Is 
the current EU capability development process still fit for 
its purpose? Unavoidably, it will also be necessary to reflect 
on what is meant by “capability” today and what the expres-
sion “full spectrum” implies in the context of an increasing-
ly contested operational landscape and the so-called digital 
revolution.
HOW AND WITH WHAT MEANS?
One of the important tasks facing the penholders of the 
Strategic Compass will be to ensure coherence between 
each of the four baskets: crisis management, resilience, ca-
pabilities, and partnerships. At this early stage, it already 
appears as though the two baskets on capabilities and part-
nerships could play a foundational role to the baskets on 
crisis management and resilience. This should in no way be 
interpreted as a secondary role for the capability and part-
nership baskets. Indeed, it is apparent that the crisis man-
agement and resilience baskets are about what the EU 
should do, whereas the capability and partnership baskets 
address how and with what means the EU should act.
Equally important will be how the discussions in the cri-
sis management and resilience baskets set the parameters 
for capability development. For example, if under the resil-
ience basket member states agree to include planning for 
Article 42.7 TEU and Article 222 TFEU contingencies, then 
this potentially pushes the Union into areas associated with 
collective defense, and this will have huge – and potential-
ly unrealistic – implications for capability development. Giv-
en the political sensitivities that these types of discussions 
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provoke, it is perhaps to be expected that many member 
states will push to have the mutual assistance and solidari-
ty clauses omitted from the resilience basket. One could, of 
course, call for their insertion in potential future iterations 
of the Strategic Compass and, what is more, not specifical-
ly including these treaty articles at this stage does not nec-
essarily curtail a reflection about the capabilities that would 
be required for crisis management and maritime security, 
cyber defense, critical infrastructure protection, supply se-
curity, etc.
USING EU DEFENSE TOOLS
Bringing together these dimensions of security will not be 
easy from a capability development perspective, and any 
coherent strategy will also have to grapple with the chal-
lenge posed by emerging technologies. Clearly, close coop-
eration between the European Commission, the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), and the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) will be necessary if the EU is to capitalize on 
initiatives being developed by the Agency and under the Eu-
ropean Defence Fund (EDF), Horizon, the industrial strategy, 
the space program, the Digital Single Market, etc. In 2021, 
the Commission has committed to drafting and publishing 
an Action Plan focusing on the linkages between civil, space, 
and defense industries. This work should be drawn on for 
the Strategic Compass, and greater attention could be paid 
to the issue of key technology dependences in the area of 
security and defense.
The capability basket could also contribute to ensuring 
greater coherence inside and across initiatives such as Per-
manent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the EDF. The 
47 ongoing PESCO projects could do with greater coher-
ence, and it remains to be seen whether some projects will 
be grouped around a core project or jettisoned altogether. 
What is a positive development is that nine PESCO projects 
have already received financial support under the European 
Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP). While 
respecting their specific legal bases, there is still room to 
ensure that PESCO and the EDF can create a positive dy-
namic for EU capability development. In this respect, the 
Strategic Compass could point the way on what ambitions 
the EU has in a specific operational domain. For example, a 
range of PESCO and EDF projects pertain to the maritime 
domain, but what is the EU’s overarching ambition as a mar-
itime actor in security and defense? Relatedly, the Compass 
should help the EU prioritize its maritime capabilities while 
also specifying how the Union can maintain and extend its 
operational and technological edge at sea. Other military 
domains would benefit from the same exercise, and the ul-
timate goal should be to have greater clarity over the EU’s 
military and industrial requirements. 
COMMON CAPABILITY PLANNING
Another challenge facing the drafters of the Strategic Com-
pass is coherence across the EU’s existing capability de-
velopment mechanisms: the Capability Development Plan 
(CDP), the High Impact Capability Goals (HICGs), the Coor-
dinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), and the Head-
line Goal Process (HLGP). An obvious starting point is to 
ensure that existing mechanisms fit together in time for 
the next round of PESCO projects in 2021. However, a bold-
er approach could seek to streamline and simplify the EU’s 
capability prioritization process. The question is how to 
achieve this without a treaty change and/or disrupting the 
current institutional landscape. Ultimately, the solution can 
only be political, and if the Strategic Compass is to provide 
the guiding hand or last word on capability prioritization at 
the EU level, then this process needs to be steered in a top-
down fashion by the HR/VP.
However, any top-down decision-making needs to be bal-
anced by the needs of EU member states. The Compass will 
ultimately fail if it does not strike roots in national defense 
planning. Fortunately, CARD and PESCO provide valuable 
conduits to national systems, but any capability priori-
ties identified by the Strategic Compass have to be man-
aged by defense planners who divide their time between 
national planning, NATO, the EU, and other capability ini-
tiatives. In this respect, it will be especially important to 
work with those EU member states that favor the NATO De-
fence Planning Process (NDPP). New ways of enhancing EU- 
NATO cooperation are required, although the autonomy 
and specific nature of each organization’s capability de-
velopment processes should be respected. Nevertheless, 
greater linkages with national capability planning systems 
works both ways: the Strategic Compass needs to consider 
some system of accountability and timelines to ensure that 
member states adhere to the targets they themselves set in 
the Council. Without such a system, the EU risks repeating 
the failures of the past – lots of concepts, little capability. 
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Partnerships
Prof. Alexander Mattelaer, Vice Dean Research of the  
Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit 
and Senior Research Fellow, Egmont Institute
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the inception of the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy, the notion of partnerships has been firmly em-
bedded into the EU’s strategic DNA. The relevant Maastricht 
Treaty provisions referenced not only the UN Charter and 
the Helsinki Final Act, but also the obligations relating to 
Europe’s common defense organized under the North At-
lantic Treaty. Promoting international cooperation, further-
more, was more than a mere means to an end: it constituted 
a foreign policy objective in its own right. As the EU is in the 
process of re-codifying its bearings via the Strategic Com-
pass, it is worthwhile to evaluate what the original part-
nership agenda has delivered, by what issues it has been 
plagued, and what may be expected in terms of its future 
prospects.
A PROLIFERATION OF PARTNERSHIPS
Looking back on the past decades, the main observation 
pertaining to the EU’s partnership agenda concerns the 
proliferation of partners and partnerships. Not only did 
the Union strike a multitude of bilateral strategic partner-
ships (with Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Rus-
sia, South Africa, South Korea, and the US), it also codified a 
range of partnerships with international organizations (with 
ASEAN, the AU, NATO, and the UN) and its very own East-
ern Partnership (with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Geor-
gia, Moldova, and Ukraine). This remains a policy objective 
to the present day. In the words of the EU’s High Represen-
tative, “we have to develop … new partnerships and at the 
same time to increase our strategic autonomy.”6 Nor has the 
EU been alone in pursuing ever-more partnerships, for that 
matter. Both NATO and the UN have pursued a wide range 
of partnerships of their own.
The net consequence of this proliferation of partnerships 
has been a gradual loss of visibility, recognizability, and rel-
6  Josep Borrell, “The EU in the multilateral system,” European Union External Action (September 19, 2020): <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/85409/eu-multilateral-system_en> (accessed October 20, 2020).
7  See Gustav Lindstrom and Thierry Tardy, eds., The EU and NATO: The essential partners (Paris, 2019).
evance of the individual partnerships. The growing number 
of partners has stretched both policy bandwidth and imple-
mentation capacity. In addition, even the most institutional-
ized and developed of partnerships – such as the EU-NATO 
relationship – have been plagued by persistent problems in 
terms of their substantive development.7 Finally, the part-
nership agenda has not been immune to the changing at-
mospherics of international relations. In particular, the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership has been characterized by growing 
contestation by Russia – itself an erstwhile strategic part-
ner of the EU. In sum, while the partnership agenda sought 
to cement international cooperation and consumed signif-
icant diplomatic resources, it has proved unable to prevent 
the erosion of international order witnessed in recent years.
THORNY ISSUES PLAGUING THE 
PARTNERSHIP AGENDA
At the conceptual level, the EU’s partnership agenda has 
been characterized by profound ambiguity about the EU’s 
own identity as an international actor. The EU has been 
traditionally conceived as a project for pacifying intra- 
European relations through economic interdependence – a 
characterization that most Europeans can readily agree on. 
Yet its foreign policy persona has been the subject of much 
contestation. Should the EU’s foreign policy extend its in-
ternal logic of fostering a qualitative change in the conduct 
of international relations? Or should it accept the reality of 
international power politics and leverage the EU’s clout at 
the service of hard-nosed interests? To a significant extent, 
this bipolarity is codified in the partnership agenda itself. 
Can the EU simultaneously team up with the UN in building 
a better world and with NATO in providing for European se-
curity – ultimately relying on the force of arms and the log-
ic of deterrence?
The contestation of both the nature and the content of Eu-
ropean foreign policy – by different member states and 
politico-ideological constituencies alike – is probably un-
avoidable. Yet as the definition of such a foreign policy re-
mains characterized by the requirement for unanimity, it is 
also to be expected that the content thereof will be charac-
terized by the lowest common denominator decision-mak-
ing. Partnerships that are lofty on rhetoric but light on 
content are likely to be a prominent feature thereof. The 
fundamental challenge for the Strategic Compass will be to 
combine meaningful prioritization with policy substance 
that reconciles different stakeholders.
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FUTURE OUTLOOK AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the identified problems, the Strategic Compass can 
successfully build on the wide network of partners that has 
been so painstakingly constructed. On the one hand, the 
prioritization of partnerships becomes easier to accomplish 
when partnerships are valued as means providing an im-
portant source of leverage in the pursuit of well-defined 
ends. The existing pool of partners can thus be organized 
along a spectrum spanning from close and value-based al-
liances to neutral and more transactional partners. On the 
other hand, the partnership agenda can be clarified by op-
erationalizing complementarity between different organi-
zations. For EU member states, policy coordination across 
different domains of power will come naturally, just as 
collective defense – relying on both nuclear and conven-
tional deterrence – comes naturally to NATO allies. The 
UN continues to provide a forum for global dialogue and 
a framework for peacekeeping operations when the Se-
curity Council can issue well-defined mandates. In other 
words, these organizations have their own specificity that 
can serve as the basis for a clear demarcation of tasks. Irre-
spective of the institutional framework in which European 
cooperation may unfold, the most fundamental factor en-
abling the Strategic Compass to accomplish its objectives 
remains the commitment among European states to ensure 
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